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Anthony	Peressini	Department	of	Philosophy	Marquette	University	September	2012	
email: anthony.peressini@marquette.edu	
Abstract:	Giulio	Tononi	(2008)	has	offered	his	integrated	information	theory	of	consciousness	(IITC)	as	a	“provisional	manifesto.”		I	critically	examine	how	the	approach	fares.		I	point	out	some	(relatively)	internal	concerns	with	the	theory	and	then	more	broadly	philosophical	ones;	finally	I	assess	the	prospects	for	IITC	as	a	fundamental	theory	of	consciousness.		I	argue	that	the	IITC’s	scientific	promise	does	carry	over	to	a	significant	extent	to	broader	philosophical	theorizing	about	qualia	and	consciousness,	though	not	as	directly	as	Tononi	suggests,	since	the	account	is	much	more	focused	on	the	qualitative	character	of	experience	rather	than	on	consciousness	itself.		I	propose	understanding	it	as	“integrated	information	theory	of	qualia”	(IITQ),	rather	than	of	consciousness.	
1. Consciousness	as	Integrated	InformationGiulio	Tononi	(2008)	has	recently	offered	his	integrated	information	theory	of	consciousness	(IITC)	as	a	“provisional	manifesto.”			I	critically	examine	how	the	approach	fares.		I	point	out	some	(relatively)	internal	concerns	in	section	2	and	then	in	section	3	some	more	broadly	philosophical	ones,	and	finally	in	section	4,	I	assess	the	prospects	for	integrated	information	(II)	as	a	fundamental	theory	of	consciousness.		I	argue	that	the	
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IITC’s	scientific	promise	does	carry	over	to	a	significant	extent	to	broader	philosophical	theorizing	about	qualia	and	consciousness,	though	not	as	directly	as	Tononi	suggests,	since	the	account	seems	much	more	focused	on	the	qualitative	character	of	experience	rather	than	on	consciousness	itself.	The	formal	definition	for	the	amount	of	integrated	information	in	a	system,	Φ,	depends	on	the	notion	of	relative	entropy	from	modern	information	theory.		Given	a	system,	
X,	characterized	by	mechanism	mech,	where	mech	consists	of	n	discrete	states,	x1,	x2,	..	.	.	xn,	one	considers	the	probability	distribution	of	its	possible	states,	p(X(mech))={p1,	p2,	.	.	.	pn}.		One	important	distribution	for	X(mech)	is	its	maximum	entropy	(equivalent	to	uniform	probability	in	many	simple	systems)	distribution:		p(X0(maxH)),	where	the	subscript	0	indicates	time	t=0,	and	would,	for	example,	look	like	{¼,	¼,	¼,	¼	},	for	n=4.		The	maximum	entropy	distribution	is	the	“zero	point”	from	which	one	measures	information	as	“distance.”1	The	distance	measure	between	two	probability	distributions,	p	and	q,		is	given	by	the	Kullback-Leibler	divergence	H,	(also	know	as	relative	entropy),	defined	as:		H[p|q]	=	pi	log(pi/qi).		Tononi	then	defines	the	effective	information	(ei)	generated	by	a	mechanism	in	a	particular	state	x1	at	t	=	1	as		
ei(X(mech,	x1))	=	H	[	p(X0(mech,	x1))	||	p(X0(maxH))	],	where	this	is	to	be	understood	as	the	information	generated	by	the	system’s	mechanism	and	state	at	t=1	about	the	system’s	prior	state	at	t=0.		Finally	the	integrated	information	Φ,	for	a	system	X	in	state	x1	is	the	difference	(measured	by	relative	entropy)	between	the	probability	distribution	generated	by	the	system	as	a	whole,	p(X0(mech,	x1))	and	the	
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probability	distribution	generated	by	X’s	decomposition	into	parts	that	leave	the	minimal	information	unaccounted	for,	denoted	MIP:		
Φ(X(mech,	x1))	=	H	[	p(X0(mech,	x1))	||	Π	p(kM0(mech,	μ0))	],	kM0	ranges	over	MIP.	Heuristically,	this	difference	can	be	thought	of	as	the	information	of	the	system	not	accounted	for	by	its	parts.	Having	set	out	this	formal	machinery,	Tononi	expresses	his	provisional	manifesto	as	follows:	the	IITC	proposes	that	consciousness	is	II,	specifically	that	(1)	the	quantity	of	consciousness	corresponds	to	the	amount	of	II	generated	by	a	complex	of	elements,	Φ,	and	(2) the	quality	of	experience	is	specified	by	the	set	of	informational	relationships	generatedwithin	that	complex.		The	informational	relationships	are	formally	characterized	by	the	properties	of	solids	(polytropes)	in	the	appropriate	2n	dimensional	space,	where	n	is	the	number	of	states	in	the	mechanism.		This	space	is	called	Q-space	and	the	2n	dimensional	solids	are	generated	by	how	the	probability	distributions	for	the	system	change	as	a	function	of	the	connections/transitions	in	the	mechanism.	Tononi	(2008,	esp	224ff)	develops	many	formal	aspects	of	Q-space	and	shows	how	these	neatly	mirror	pre-theoretic	conceptions	of	the	qualitative	aspect	of	experience.		For	example,	he	develops	a	property	of	the	q-arrows	(sides)	of	solids	in	Q-space	he	calls	entanglement.		This	formal	property	is	argued	to	capture	the	notion	of	modes	in	qualitative	experience	(sight,	sound,	etc.).		Another	important	feature	is	that	qualia	so	construed	in	Q-space	are	context	dependent	in	a	way	that	parallels	our	sense	that	the	subjective	qualities	of	experience	(qualia)	are	dependent	on	the	broader	“qualia	context,”	e.g.,	the	particular	red	qualia	a	subject	experiences	when	viewing	the	red	of	a	stop	sign	may	well	be	different	if	it	is	part	of	a	visual	field	that	includes	a	high	percentage	of	reds	of	varying	shades.	Finally,	some	shapes	in	Q-
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space	seem	to	be	elementary	in	that	they	cannot	be	further	decomposed	(do	not	contain	any	more	densely	entangled	sub-sub-modes),	and	these	would	seems	to	correspond	to	“what	philosophers	call	a	‘quale’	in	the	narrow	sense—say	a	pure	color	like	red,	or	a	pain,	or	an	itch	.	.	.”	(230).	To	sum	up	the	account,	(in	Tononi’s	words):		“Perhaps	the	most	important	notion	emerging	from	this	approach	is	that	an	experience	is	a	shape	in	Q.		According	to	the	IITC,	this	
shape	completely	and	univocally	specifies	the	quality	of	the	experience”	(228)	[original	italics].		I	move	on	now	to	an	appraisal	of	the	IITC	approach.		
2.	Internal	Concerns	In	this	section	I	present	concerns	with	the	II	approach	that	have	to	do	with	the	internal	cogency	of	II	as	a	theory	of	a	fundamental	property	of	the	brain.		These	concerns	are	whether	the	notion	of	II	is	well	defined	in	a	formal	sense	for	an	arbitrary	system	and	second	how	the	(notorious)	difficulty	in	interpreting	probability	affects	the	II	account.		
2.1	Is	Integrated	Information	Well	Defined?	The	notion	of	a	good	definition	in	mathematics	(a	term	being	well	defined)	means	roughly	that	the	defined	operation	or	concept	or	entity	is	unambiguous.			For	example,	with	cosets	of	a	group	relative	to	a	subgroup	H,	one	defines	the	right	coset	as:	Ha={hεH	|	ha}.		A	product	operation	on	right	cosets	is	then	defined	as	HaHb	=	H(ab),	but	one	has	to	establish	that	the	result	is	unambiguous.		In	this	case	that	amounts	to	showing	that	the	coset	picked	out	by	Ha	doesn’t	depend	on	the	particular	element,	a,	used	to	represent	it.		Thus	one	must	prove	that	if	b	ε	Ha,	then	Ha	=	Hb.2		The	concern	here	is	that	Φ,	which	is	to	
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be	understood	as	the	amount	of	consciousness	of	a	complex,	be	well	defined	in	that	the	value	of	Φ	for	a	given	system	must	always	exist	and	be	unique.		Now	of	course	for	the	simple	systems	of	4	nodes	that	are	considered	by	Tononi,	Φ	is	a	straightforward	calculation,	but	things	aren’t	always	that	simple.	Recall	that	the	definition	of	Φ	for	a	system	X	in	a	state	x1	as	characterized	by	mechanism	mech	is	the	difference	between	the	probability	distribution	generated	by	the	system	as	a	whole,	p(X0(mech,	x1))	and	the	probability	distribution	generated	by	X’s	decomposition	into	parts	that	“leaves	the	least	information	unaccounted	for,”	(220),	denoted	MIP	(minimum	information	partition).	The	relative	entropy	of	the	system	measures	this	difference	between	the	II	of	the	whole	and	its	maximally	“informative”	partition,	again	formally:	
Φ(X(mech,	x1))	=	H	[	p(X0(mech,	x1))	||	Π	p(kM0(mech,	μ0))	],		where	kM0	ranges	over	MIP.3		Thus	the	definition	of	Φ	depends	on	identifying	a	particular	decomposition	(MIP)	from	the	set	of	all	possible	decompositions,	but	of	course	there	are	in	general	many	different	ways	of	dividing	a	system	into	parts.		Tononi	adds	a	further	constraint	on	the	set	of	“admissible”	decompositions:		we	understand	the	eligible	decompositions	as	being	determined	by	the	causal	mechanism	of	the	system	(220).4		The	concern	is	that	this	still	need	not	determine	a	unique	decomposition.		In	order	for	Φ	to	be	well	defined,	it	must	be	possible	to	show	that	the	set	of	(causally)	possible	decompositions,	D,	has	a	minimal	element	relative	to	the	value	in	question,	in	this	case	the	“distance”	from	p(X0(mech,	x1)).		Regardless	of	what	is	to	be	minimized	(or	maximized),	the	question	of	whether	such	a	min/max	exists	(and	is	unique)	over	D	is	unclear.5		Unless,	such	a	result	can	be	established,	the	application	of	the	formalism	comes	apart.		And	the	deeper	consequence	
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of	this	(assuming	no	proof	is	forthcoming)	is	that	a	complex	has	no	definite	II,	and	if	II	is	consciousness,	then	the	complex	has	no	definite	amount	of	consciousness—nor	is	there	a	definite	answer	to	whether	it	has	consciousness	at	all	(whether	Φ>0).	Even	if	one	had	reason	to	believe	that	a	unique	Φ	exists	in	general,	further	questions	remain.		Why	think	that	the	degree	of	consciousness	of	the	complex	should	track	the	II	associated	with	the	minimal	information	partition	(MIP)?		It	is	true	that	on	Tononi’s	account,	II	is	defined	in	terms	of	the	MIP,	so	strictly	speaking	there	no	II	except	as	calculated	in	terms	of	the	MIP.		Nonetheless	one	may	consider	notions	closely	related	to	II	(defined	relative	to	other	significant	partitions)	that	may	correspond	equally	well	to	the	complex’s	degree	of	“informational	integration,”	understood	more	generally.		In	other	words,	consciousness	may	align	with	“informational	integration”	and	yet	not	track	the	state’s	entropy	relative	to	the	minimal	information	partition	(II	defined	as	Φ),	but	rather	relative	to	some	other	partition	favored	for	some	physically	or	informationally	significant	reason.			Finally,	there	is	the	assumption	(built	in	from	the	beginning)	that	the	system	is	characterized	by	“a	certain	mechanism.”	This	would	seem	to	limit	the	analysis	to	systems	that	are	(or	can	be	approximately	or	provisionally	characterized)	mechanistically,	which	brains	systems	may	or	may	not	be.		Even	if	II	(understood	more	generally	as	above)	is	the	key	to	consciousness,	must	it	be	characterized	mechanistically?		By	relativizing	II	to	the	Φ	of	a	system	under	a	particular	(mechanistic)	description,	the	approach	is	again	susceptible	to	“well	definition”	problems:		on	what	principle	does	one	adjudicate	between	potentially	distinct	mechanistic	characterizations	of	system,	each	with	distinct	Φ’s?		The	amount	consciousness	of	a	system	is	presumably	a	definite	value	and	yet	the	system	has	the	
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potential	to	have	multiple	Φ	values,	depending	on	what	particular	(mechanistic)	description	one	uses.		Tononi	does	have	a	response	to	this	concern	in	that	he	seems	to	maintain	that	the	brain	(and	all	physical	systems)	have	a	fundamental	mechanistic	description	that	is	uniquely	determined	by	its	physical	composition,	namely,	the	one	with	“minimal	elements	and	minimal	interactions—as	elementary	as	they	come	in	terms	of	physical	implementation”	(2008,	234).		If	sustainable,	such	a	view	would	alleviate	some	of	these	last	concerns.		There	is,	however,	reason	to	be	skeptical	of	this	reductive	mechanistic	assumption,	not	the	least	of	which	is	that	it	seems	to	be	in	tension	with	Tononi’s	recognition	that	II	is	generated	at	“multiple	spatiotemporal	scales”	and	that	one	should	vary	the	grain	size	in	order	to	maximize	Φ	(2008,	235-36).6	It	is	a	limiting	feature	of	the	II	approach	(as	developed	via	Φ)	that	it	requires	the	system	under	consideration	to	be	mechanistic.		Simple	node	networks	with	on/off	connections	are	not	without	their	predictive	and	investigative	use,	but	if	the	II	approach	is	really	limited	to	mechanistic	understandings	of	the	brain,	then	it	looses	a	great	deal	of	its	plausibility	as	the	key	to	consciousness.		It	seems	it	might	be	possible	to	generalize	the	II	approach	in	some	directions.	7		For	example,	the	restriction	of	the	formal	characterizations	of	the	systems	to	(finite)	discrete	states	is	not	a	mathematical	necessity;	the	formal	mathematics	of	relative	entropy	for	continuous	random	variables	was	worked	out	by	Kolmogorov	(1956)	and	has	been	since	refined	with	ancillary	results	(see	Cover	and	Thomas	2006).		The	problem	with	this	generalization	of	II	is	that	while	the	quantity	of	consciousness	is	preserved,	it	isn’t	at	all	clear	that	the	quality	of	consciousness	(as	developed	by	way	of	Tononi’s	Q-space)	can	be.		The	dimension	of	the	Q-space	for	a	given	X(mech,x1)	is	the	number	of	possible	states	for	the	mechanism,	which	in	the	case	of	a	
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continuous	variable	is	infinite.		While	infinite	dimensional	spaces	are	well	understood	in	some	cases	(i.e.,	those	with	finite	norms	or	distance	functions	known	as	Banach	spaces),	it	isn’t	clear	how	Q-spaces	will	fare	in	infinite	dimensions.		The	points	in	Q-space	would	be	functions,	and	the	maximum	entropy	distribution	would	again	be	the	baseline	for	understanding	the	various	properties	(divergence,	null	context,	distance	between	distributions,	etc.),	but	it	isn’t	a	given	in	this	context	that	the	maximum	entropy	distribution	would	exist	(be	finite).8		So	again	one	is	placed	in	a	position	to	establish	(as	in	the	case	of	the	MIP)	significant	mathematical	results	in	order	for	the	formalism	to	be	mathematically	rigorous	and	have	meaningful	physical	interpretations.		Tononi	(2008,	229)	acknowledges	something	like	this.9		
2.2	Probability	and	Integrated	Information	The	difficulties	with	interpreting	probability	go	to	back	to	the	very	beginning	of	the	formal	probability	calculus.		I	am	sympathetic	with	the	idea	that	probability	is	often	implicitly	defined	in	its	scientific	contexts	and	that	a	detailed	interpretation	is	not	something	a	scientist	working	on	a	scientific	problem	need	have	in	hand.		Also,	a	pluralist	account	of	probability	is	likely	correct,	so	pressing	a	particular	interpretation	against	the	II	account	would	be	unreasonable,	or	at	least	premature.	Nonetheless,	since	this	scientific	theory	of	consciousness	is	being	offered	as	a	solution	to	the	philosophical	problem	of	consciousness	(and	also	because	consciousness,	unlike	say	population	genetics,	has	from	the	start	a	“foot	planted	deeply	in	the	mud”	of	philosophy),	the	worry	about	the	interpretation	of	the	probability	is	germane.	
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The	probability	involved	in	information	theory	comes	from	the	definition	of	entropy	and	thereby	effective	information,	(ei).		Recall	that	(ei)	involves	probability	distributions	of	the	form	p(X0(mech,	x1)),	that	is,	a	probability	distribution	over	all	possible	states,	x,	of	the	system	X0,	specifying	the	probability	that	the	system’s	prior	state	was	x,	where	the	system	X0	is	being	considered	as	a	mechanism	specified	by	mech	in	state	x1.		An	immediate	question	is	whether	probability	is	simply	a	mathematical	device	for	measuring	consciousness	or	whether	probability	is	in	some	sense	constitutive	of	consciousness.		Obviously	the	former	case	raises	fewer	questions,	but	even	if	II	were	not	essentially	probabilistic,	questions	of	interpreting	the	formal	probability	involved	in	its	operationalization	may	make	a	difference	in	how	(or	whether)	we	are	inclined	to	understand	the	consciousness	as	II	proposal.		For	example,	if	one	adopts	a	subjectivist	interpretation	(e.g.,	Bayesian),	then	as	Michael	Beaton	argues	Tononi’s	approach	via	Φ	(and	it’s	internal	measure	of	information)	is	misguided	as	a	means	of	fleshing	out	our	pre-theoretic	notions	of	integrated	information.10	If,	however,	consciousness	is	understood	as	constituted	(at	least	in	part)	by	the	probability	involved	in	its	definition	via	Φ,	then	much	more	turns	on	how	we	understand	this	probability.		Consider	the	example	of	fitness	in	evolutionary	biology—how	probability	functions	in	its	standard	definition	as	“the	probability	of	surviving	and	reproducing.”		Here	the	probabilistic	property	is	generally	not	understood	as	corresponding	to	a	fundamental	feature	of	the	universe,	but	rather	something	reducible	in	an	ontological	sense	(though	perhaps	supervenient	on	the	properties	and	hence	irreducible	in	other	senses)	to	the	“causal	push	and	pull	of	the	universe.”	If	the	II	theory’s	move	is	to	identify	consciousness	with	probability	understood	something	like	this	(again,	though	one	that	is	oddly	predictive	
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of	past	“states”	as	opposed	to	the	future	“states”	of	fitness),	it	is	difficult	to	see	it	as	addressing	the	(apparently)	fundamental,	novel,	emergent	character	of	consciousness	in	the	sense	intended	by	Tononi.	In	Tononi’s	presentation,	one	finds	a	few	hints	as	to	how	he	is	thinking	of	probability.		The	mechanistic	framework	with	finite	states	naturally	suggests	a	classical/frequentist	interpretation.		In	this	case	probabilities	are	considered	the	frequencies	of	favorable	events	relative	to	either	all	possible	(classical)	or	actual	(frequentist)	outcomes.			There	is	solid	precedent	for	the	classical	interpretation	in	the	scientific	orthodoxy	of	the	previous	century,	but	“it	is	now	widely	agreed	that	there	are	insuperable	difficulties”	with	it	(Eells	1991,	note	7,	p.	35),	so	it	cannot	but	give	one	pause	regarding	understanding	consciousness	in	terms	of	it.	Alternatively,	since	consciousness	is	to	be	understood	as	a	fundamental	and	really	“out	there	in	the	universe”	(objective)	phenomenon,	then	a	more	natural	interpretation	might	be	the	propensity	account.		On	the	propensity	interpretation,	probabilities	are	understood	as	physical	dispositions	(propensities)	to	behave	in	a	certain	way;	these	are	grounded	in	the	physical	make	up	of	the	system	and	thus	have	the	virtue	of	rendering	probability	objective.		On	the	other	hand,	subjectivist	accounts	(Bayesian)	have	the	advantage	of	being	tied	neatly	to	notions	of	rationality,	which	has	a	natural	connection	to	consciousness.		And	Tononi	does	describe	the	probabilities	involved	as	“constituting	information	.	.	.	in	the	classical	sense	of	reduction	of	uncertainty	or	ignorance”	(220),	which	sounds	like	a	subjectivist	interpretation.11	Since	all	of	these	interpretations	are	grounded	(to	varying	degrees	and	in	varying	ways)	in	sciences	like	physics	and	biology,	one	might	argue	that	if	probability	is	good	
  
CII-Critique, p. 11 
enough	for	these	sciences,	then	why	not	for	neuroscience?		But	again,	the	issue	here	is	not	whether	philosophical	problems	with	understanding	probability	pose	a	threat	to	the	scientific	theories	(they	don’t),	but	rather	whether	such	problems	pose	a	threat	to	an	
interpretation	of	the	scientific	theory	as	addressing	the	philosophical	problem	of	consciousness	(I	suggest	they	do).		In	particular,	the	move	to	understand	consciousness	in	terms	of	II	is	in	important	senses	equivalent	to	understanding	it	in	terms	probability,	so	questions	about	probability	become	questions	that	remain	about	consciousness.12		Since	among	other	things	the	objective	reality	of	probability	is	not	quite	settled,	the	philosophical	import	of	the	proposal	cannot	be	assessed,	even	along	such	coarse	lines	as	whether	it	is	real	(objective)	property.	Given	the	problems	with	all	interpretations	of	probability,	the	hope	of	simply	solving	the	philosophical	problem	of	consciousness	by	analyzing	it	in	terms	information	seems	notably	problematic.			Despite	this,	I’ll	argue	below	that	its	scientific	merit	does	offer	tools	for	making	philosophical	progress	too.			
3.	Philosophical	Concerns	I	now	examine	the	philosophical	plausibility	of	the	move	to	identify	consciousness	with	II.		I	begin	with	questions	concerning	the	distinction	between	consciousness	and	qualia.		Next	I	consider	a	more	modest	“qualia	as	II”	proposal	(IITQ),	and	finally	I	reassess	the	prospects	for	regaining	from	IITQ	the	more	sweeping	“consciousness	as	II”	(IITC)	identity.			
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3.1	Consciousness	vs.	Qualia	The	term	“consciousness,”	despite	David	Chalmers’	and	others	efforts,	still	engenders	confusion	above	and	beyond	the	natural	philosophical	disagreement	over	one’s	own	favorite	account.		Some	such	confusion	is	present	in	Tononi’s	account,	so	pinning	it	down	will	help	bring	into	relief	both	strengths	and	shortcomings	of	the	II	approach.		I	propose	to	understand	consciousness	along	the	line	proposed	by	Chalmers	(following	Nagel),	to	wit,	let	the	predicate	SIL(x)	≡	“there	is	something	it’s	like	to	be	x.”13		So	according	to	our	intuitive	understanding,	SIL(Chalmers)	is	true	and	SIL(my	thermostat)	is	false.		Notice	that	this	predicate	formally	leaves	open	whether	SIL(x)	entails	that	x	has	any	particular	qualia.		It	also	leaves	open	whether	there	is	in	fact	any	natural	property	in	the	world	to	which	the	predicate	corresponds.14		The	SIL	focus	puts	the	emphasis	on	the	“experiencing”	aspect	of	conscious	experience	and	doesn’t	rush	to	conflate	the	subjective	aspects	and	the	qualitative	aspects	of	consciousness;	I	return	to	this	shortly.	The	notion	of	qualia	goes	back	to	Lewis	(1929)	originally	and	vaulted	into	prominence	because	it	has	been	offered	as	a	sticking	point	for	functionalist	and	other	physicalist	accounts	of	mind.15		Qualia	are	understood	to	be	the	“qualitative	aspects”	of	conscious	experience,	e.g.,	if	one	is	seeing	a	stop	sign	then	the	way	the	red	appears	to	one	in	his/her	phenomenological	field	is	a	red	quale.		There	are	presumably	qualia	associated	with	all	sense	modalities	and	other	states	like	emotions,	moods,	etc.		Without	getting	into	the	many	thorny	areas	of	qualia	or	being	insistent	on	any	particular	understanding,	I	note	the	following	further	features	of	qualia:	they	appear	practically	ineffable,	non-relational,	non-public,	and	immediately	available	to	the	subject.		For	notation,	let	Qi(x)	denote	“x’s	
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experience	has	an	i	qualitative	aspect,”	so	Qred(Chalmers)	is	true	when	Chalmers	is	looking	at	a	stop	sign	under	normal	conditions.	Consciousness	and	qualia	are	often	run	together	in	some	way,	e.g.,	Chalmers	in	his	“hard	problem”	paper	(1995)	moves	between	Nagel’s	“smoothing	it	is	like”	(SIL)	notion	as	applied	to	creatures	and	the	phenomenological	properties	of	mental	states	themselves	(qualia).		But	it	isn’t	obvious	that	the	problem	of	what	makes	an	organism	a	subjective	experiencer	in	Nagel’s	sense	(SIL-consciousness)	and	the	problem	of	what	makes	a	state	a	qualitative	or	phenomenological	are	so	simply	related.		Others	have	realized	this,	for	example,	Leopold	Stubenberg	(1998)	believes	that	it	requires	a	350+	page	book	to	argue	that	to	be	conscious	is	to	have	qualia.		More	recently,	Michael	Beaton	(2009),	in	working	on	consciousness	and	qualia	(by	way	of	introspection),	concerns	himself	with	the	“phenomenal	aspect	of	consciousness:	with	qualia;	with	the	‘something	it	is	like’	to	have	an	experience”	(Beaton	2009,	88).			Beaton	is	more	careful,	in	a	footnote	(#1,	p.	89)	he	writes	that	“qualia	are	the	characteristic	properties	of	phenomenological	consciousness:	something	is	a	state	of	phenomenological	consciousness	if	and	only	if	it	has	such	properties”	but	intends	not	to	“completely	ignore	the	many	other	aspects	of	present	within	the	broader	concept	of	‘consciousness.’”		The	point	is	that	the	problem	of	subjective	experience	(SIL-consciousness)	ought	not	be	thought	of	as	identical	to	the	problem	of	qualia.			To	sort	this	out,	it	helps	to	attend	carefully	to	the	distinction	between	creature	consciousness	and	state	consciousness,	and	also	of	course	between	“something	it	is	like”	consciousness	and	other	less	philosophically	problematic	kinds.		I	use	the	term	SIL-consciousness	to	refer	to	the	property	of	being	a	conscious	experiencer	in	Nagel’s	
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“something	it	is	like”	sense.		I	employ	it	in	a	strong	sense	in	that	SIL-consciousness	is	not	reductively	assumed	to	be	simply	the	sum	total	of	a	creature’s	qualitative	or	phenomenal	or	p-conscious	states	at	a	given	moment.16		That	is,	the	question	of	the	nature	of	a	creature’s	SIL-consciousness	is	not	assumed	to	be	the	same	as	the	question	of	the	nature	of	the	creature’s	p-conscious	states.		To avoid confusion, I will avoid the term “p-conscious,” since it 
is variously used to refer to both (a) qualia or phenomenality, understood as properties of mental 
states and also to (b) being a subjective experiencer, understood as a property of a creature as a 
whole not its individual mental states.  I move back and forth between the terms “qualia” and 
“phenomenality” depending on context with the understanding that qualia are the 
phenomenological properties of mental states.	In	Tononi’s	II	account,	these	relationships	are	not	explicitly	addressed,	but	some	reasoned	guesses	are	in	order.		Initially	he	describes	consciousness	in	a	way	that	suggests	SIL-consciousness:			“[consciousness]	is	what	vanishes	every	night	when	we	fall	into	dreamless	sleep	and	reappears	when	we	wake	up	or	dream.		It	is	also	all	we	are	and	all	we	have:		lose	consciousness	and,	as	far	as	you	are	concerned,	your	own	self	and	the	entire	world	dissolves	into	nothingness”	(216).			Yet	more	often,	especially	in	the	scientific	core	of	the	paper,	“to	be	conscious”	amounts	to	nothing	more	than	“to	have	a	vivid	experience	of	red”	(234),	at	which	point	it	isn’t	SIL-consciousness	under	consideration,	but	rather	a	qualitative	aspect	of	a	conscious	experience,	Qi(x).	A	closer	look	at	the	structure	of	Tononi’s	argument	is	helpful.		The	main	argument	for	his	claim	that	that	“consciousness	=	II”	is	(1)	that	the	quantity	of	II	in	the	brain	seems	to	
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be	correlated	with	the	presence	of	consciousness	(awake/asleep	sense),	and	(2)	the	qualitative	aspects	of	consciousness	can	be	modeled	by	the	formal	model	generated	by	projecting	entropy	distributions	for	each	of	the	n	possible	states	onto	n-space	in	such	a	way	that	the	formal	properties	of	this	Q-space	capture	many	qualitative	properties	of	conscious	experience.		The	empirical	evidence	marshaled	for	(1)	consists	of	illustrating	how	certain	parts	of	the	brain	that	are	high	in	II,	when	lesioned	or	when	“off	line”	because	of	deep	sleep	or	anesthesia,	lead	to	the	subject	no	longer	being	conscious.		The	empirical	evidence	used	in	(2)	is	more	robust	in	that	it	involves	showing	how	the	formal	properties	of	Q-space	line	up	with	intuitive	and	empirical	features	of	qualia	and	what	are	presumed	to	be	their	neuro-anatomical	bases,	thus	allowing	for	more	diverse	directions	of	confirmation	and	the	unification	of	disparate	phenomena,	both	from	cognitive	psychology	and	neurology.17	From	this	schematic	of	the	argument,	it	is	clear	that	Tononi	is	addressing	Qi(x),	and	not	SIL-consciousness	in	(2).		The	more	difficult	question	is	whether	SIL-consciousness	is	being	taken	up	in	(1),	that	is,	whether	there	is	reason	to	believe	that	the	quantity	of	“consciousness”	being	characterized	in	(1)	via	Φ	might	be,	as	Tononi	seems	to	suggest,	the	quantity	of	SIL-consciousness.		I	believe	here	Tononi	is	making	a	mistake	that	many	philosophers	make	in	this	context,	namely,	conflating	SIL-consciousness	of	a	creature	and	the	qualitative	properties	of	mental	states.		He	might	thus	be	(mis?)interpreted	as	implicitly	proposing	a	reduction	of	SIL(x)	to	all	of	the	Qi(x)	at	the	given	time.		In	this	case	we	understand	II	to	track	consciousness	(SIL-sense)	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	the	II-gradient	in	Q-space	tracks	the	qualitative	features	Qi(x)	of	experience.	This	cannot	but	disappoint	those	who	understand	the	problem	of	consciousness	along	traditional	philosophical	lines—focusing	on	the	SIL	understanding—because	it	
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unceremoniously	eliminates	or	ignores	the	“hard	problem”	and	the	explanatory	gap	issues.18		The	identification	of	SIL-consciousness	with	informational	properties	leaves	unaddressed	why	and	how	it	is	that	II	rich	neuronal	complexes	have	something	it	is	like	to	be	them	as	opposed	to	nothing	at	all.		Notice,	however,	that	the	II	account	does	address	the	question	of	why	it	is	that	the	neural	basis	of	my	bluish	experience	has	the	qualitative	character	it	does	as	opposed	to	a	different	qualitative	character	or	none	at	all.	Thus	there	is	a	better	case	to	be	made	for	Tononi’s	contribution.		The	reasoning	just	described	fails	to	satisfy	philosophically	not	because	it	sidesteps	the	“hard	problem”	or	explanatory	gap	but	because	it	conflates	SIL-consciousness	and	the	phenomenality	of	mental	states	and	in	so	doing	obscures	the	difference	between	the	subjective	and	the	qualitative	character	of	conscious	experience.			Understood	in	its	best	light,	the	II	account	shouldn’t	be	seen	as	directly	addressing	SIL-consciousness	with	its	all-important	subjective	character,	but	rather	the	qualitative	character	of	consciousness	(qualia),	understood	as	distinct	from	the	subjective	character.	To	make	this	clear,	one	must	refine	the	difference	between	SIL-consciousness	and	qualia	(phenomenality),	making	use	of	the	distinction	between	the	qualitative	and	subjective	characters	of	conscious	experience.		Loosely	following	Levine	(2001)	and	more	recently	Kriegel	(2009),	notice	that	conscious	experience	has	at	least	the	following	two	aspects:		a	qualitative	character	and	a	“for-me”	or	subjective	character.		When	I	experience	a	clear	blue	sky,	the	experience	has	a	q-character	(qualitative)	of	“bluishness”	and	an	s-character	(subjective)	of	“being	mine”	in	that	intimate	first	person	subjective	sense.19		Note	that	in	distinguishing	the	subjective	and	qualitative	aspects	of	experience,	I	am	not	suggesting	that	subjectivity	is	something	we	“experience”	independently	of	qualia.		My	
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point	is	that	subjectivity	is	not	(necessarily)	constituted	by	the	qualitative	aspect	of	experience,	though	our	sense	of	our	own	subjectivity	may	well	be	qualitative.		With	this	distinction	in	hand,	we	can	understand	SIL-consciousness,	the	question	of	what	makes	an	entity	an	experiencer	in	Nagel’s	sense,	as	fundamentally	about	the	s-character	of	conscious	experience,	and	questions	about	the	nature	of	qualitative	states	(or	“phenomenological”)	as	fundamentally	about	the	q-character	of	conscious	experience.	I	do	not	intend	to	assert	that	SIL-consciousness	involves	only	the	s-character	and	that	qualia	involve	only	the	q-character;	further	philosophical	consideration	might	be	helpful	on	this	question	but	in	the	end	empirical	work	will	be	required	to	decide	the	issue.		I	am	arguing	only	that	SIL-consciousness	is	not	obviously	the	same	as	qualia	(as	I	have	outlined	them)	and	that	while	SIL-consciousness	may	well	be	implicated	in	both	the	s-character	and	q-character,	the	question	of	qualia	is	essentially	about	q-character	and	in	principle	can	be	empirically	investigated	independently	of	s-character.		It	may	turn	out	that	SIL-consciousness	(in	us)	is	always	associated	with	qualia,	but	again	that	is	an	empirical	question.20		Conversely,	one	may	question	whether	having	qualia	entails	being	SIL-consciousness,	i.e.,	does	Qi(x)	entail	SIL(x)?		This	entailment	is	more	difficult	to	leave	empirically	open	because	given	the	way	I’ve	laid	things	out,	another	way	of	putting	it	is:		does	having	a	qualitative	experience	entail	being	an	experiencer?		It	would	seem	to—and	this	may	pose	a	difficulty	for	understanding	the	II	approach	as	an	account	of	qualia	and	not	necessarily	of	consciousness.	As	I’ve	argued	above	Tononi’s	empirical	argument	for	“II	=	consciousness”	directly	supports	at	most	“II	=	qualia,”	and	not	that	“II	=	being	an	experiencer.”		But	if	having	qualia	entails	being	an	experiencer,	then	a	proponent	of	the	(refined)	II	account,	which	asserts	
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that	II	rich	complexes	have	qualia,	had	better	convince	us	either	(a)	that	such	II	rich	complexes	are	themselves	(or	are	necessarily	embedded	in)	experiencers,	or	(b)	that	we	ought	to	give	up	the	entailment	from	qualia	to	experience.		At	first	glance	neither	(a)	nor	(b)	look	very	promising.		But	I’ll	argue	below	there	is	a	way	to	understand	(b)	that	renders	“II	=	qualia”	as	a	coherent	empirical	possibility.		But	first,	does	Tononi	have	a	convincing	case	for	(a)?		I	don’t	think	so.	The	argument	Tononi	gives	(217-219)	to	support	the	identification	of	consciousness	(SIL-sense)	with	II	consists	of	two	thought	experiments.		The	first	is	intended	to	suggest	that	one	important	difference	between	our	seeing	a	light	and	a	simple	photodiode	“seeing”	a	light	is	our	ability	to	discriminate	between	many	more	alternatives,	so	“the	[II]	theory	says	that	the	more	specifically	one’s	mechanisms	discriminate	between	what	pure	light	is	and	what	it	is	not	…	the	more	one	is	conscious	of	it”	(218).		But	sheer	ability	to	discriminate	is	not	enough	to	allow	for	conscious	experience	as	his	second	thought	experiment	illustrates:		a	camera	consisting	of	a	million	independent	binary	photodiodes,	which	can	from	the	outside	be	considered	to	have	21,000,000	states	and	thus	an	astronomical	ability	to	discriminate.		Tononi	goes	on	to	argue	that,	“since	its	1	million	photodiodes	have	no	way	to	interact,	.	.	.	there	is	no	intrinsic	point	of	view	associated	with	the	camera	chip	as	a	whole”	(219).		The	reasoning	here	is	that	the	irreducible	and	holistic	nature	of	the	unity	of	our	phenomenological	experience	supports	the	idea	that	conscious	experience	is	(or	tracks)	II	because	in	a	similar	way,	integrated	neural	mechanisms	high	in	II	cannot	be	“disconnected”	or	reduced	into	components	and	retain	their	II.	While	such	“thought	experiments”	are	effective	at	illustrating	how	II	works	and	how	it	tracks	the	“richness	of	experience”	in	terms	of	information	and	the	ability	to	discriminate	
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one	state	from	many	others,	it	is	doubtful	that	anyone	hesitant	to	accept	“SIL-consciousness	as	II”	for	philosophical	or	pre-theoretical	or	intuitive	or	phenomenological	reasons	would	find	such	thought	experiments	compelling.		The	first	experiment,	in	associating	greater	ability	to	discriminate	a	thing	from	other	things	with	being	“more	conscious	…	of	it,”	at	best	taps	intuitions	relevant	to	“consciousness”	in	the	sense	of	the	quantity	of	awareness	or	attention	(a-consciousness),	not	SIL-consciousness.		And	while	the	second	integrated	example	does	get	at	something	more	than	a-consciousness	with	its	focus	on	the	holistic	and	irreducible	nature	of	conscious	expeience,	the	parallel	between	this	and	II’s	“holistic	and	irreducible”	character	is	thin	stuff	on	which	to	ground	the	claim	that	SIL-consciousness	is	integrated	information,	as	opposed	to	the	claim	that	SIL-consciousness	is	dependent	on	integrated	information.21			Then	how	might	one	understand	the	“qualia	as	II”	project	in	light	of	the	pre-theoretic	entailment	from	qualia	to	experience?		With	the	s-	and	q-character	distinction	in	hand,	consider	again	the	conscious	experience	of	a	full	field	blue	wall—the	qualitative	visual	experience	of	it	consists	of	a	q-character,	it’s	bluishness,	but	also	an	s-character,	its	“for	me-ness.”		It	is	what	one	might	call	the	“subjective	consequence	condition”	(SCC)	that	if	a	state	has	a	subjective	character,	then	it	is	the	state	of	an	experiencer.		Thus,	Qblue(x)	can	be	understood	to	entail	SIL(x)	via	its	s-character	in	particular,	and	not	necessarily	its	q-character.		Symbolically	it	might	be	put	something	like	the	following.	Definition	of	qualia:				 	 Qblue(x)	<=>	qblue(x)	&	sblue(x),		Subj.	Consequence	Condition:	 sblue(x)	->	SIL(x),		therefore		 	 	 	 Qblue(x)	->	SIL(x).			
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Tononi’s	revised	II	account	can	then	be	understood	as	an	account	of	the	q-character	of	experience.		Is	this	an	account	of	qualia?		Well,	yes	and	no.		If	qualia	and	subjective	experience	(SIL)	are	conflated	then	the	II	account	wouldn’t	seem	to	be	an	account	of	qualia.		If	however,	the	problem	of	qualia	is	understood	as	distinct	from	the	problem	of	SIL-consciousness,	with	the	former	being	fundamentally	about	experience’s	q-character	and	the	latter	fundamentally	about	experience’s	s-character,	then	the	II	account	makes	sense	as	scientific	theory	of	qualia	in	the	sense	of	experience’s	q-character.		Thus	on	the	integrated	information	account	of	qualia,	the	explanatory	gap	is	bifurcated	and	refined,	but	it	is	still	there	(as	it	should	be).22		It	bifurcates	into	the	qualia	or	Q-question	and	the	subjective	or	S-question.		The	Q-question	is	why	does	the	neural	basis	of	my	bluish	experience	have	the	qualitative	character	it	does,	as	opposed	to	a	different	qualitative	character	or	none	at	all?		The	S-question	is	why	does	the	neural	information	processing	system	that	is	my	brain	have	something	it	is	like	to	be	me,	as	opposed	to	nothing	at	all.		The	integrated	information	account	of	qualia	addresses	the	Q-question	and	not	(directly)	the	S-question.	So	why	opt	for	the	qualia	understanding	of	the	II	account?		I	recap	my	two	reasons	offered	above	and	give	one	more.	First,	the	problem	of	what	constitutes	an	experiencer	seems	much	more	at	the	heart	of	the	consciousness	question,	both	from	a	philosophical	perspective	and	from	a	pre-theoretic	intuitive	perspective.		Second,	allowing	SIL-consciousness	to	be	conceptually	distinct	from	qualia	leaves	the	theoretical	space	more	open	for	empirical	investigation	(decides	less	from	the	“arm	chair”)	and	“allows”	important	scientific	contributions	(like	Tononi’s)	to	be	relevant	to	the	philosophical	problem.		And	finally,	this	bracketing	move	can	be	found	in	other	cognitive	research	programs,	for	example	memory,	which	has	been	productively	studied	in	its	own	right	despite	the	fact	that	
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most	manifestations	of	memory	involve	it	being	consciously	or	subjectively	presented.		Memory	research	brackets	the	s-character	of	conscious	memory	experience	so	that	work	on	memory	itself	and	on	what	makes	it	conscious	(its	s-character)	can	proceed	relatively	independently.		In	a	similar	way,	the	II	account	of	qualia	may	be	understood	as	having	identified	qualia	with	a	feature	of	the	brain,	and	despite	its	connection	to	SIL-consciousness,	has	begun	to	investigate	and	understand	it	in	its	own	right.23			
	
3.2	Correlation	or	Identity	Once	one	carefully	distinguishes	between	SIL-consciousness	(hereafter	just	“consciousness”)	and	qualia	in	the	setting	of	II,	the	theory’s	plausibility	(and	scope)	becomes	clearer.		As	I	outlined	above,	the	II	approach	has	its	most	compelling	and	direct	support	as	an	account	of	qualia	as	opposed	to	consciousness.		That	is,	Tononi’s	considerations	suggest	the	identification	of	the	qualitative	aspects	of	conscious	experience,	Qi(x),	with	II,	since	the	majority	of	the	detailed	scientific	theorizing	concerns	qualia	and	its	connection	with	II	via	Q-space.		The	connections	between	the	formal	properties	of	Q-space	and	what	we	know	of	the	neurophysiological	and	phenomenological	properties	of	qualia	are	compelling.			But	again,	this	confirmation	is	limited	to	qualia.		I	will	return	to	the	question	of	how	consciousness	might	be	related	to	II	below,	but	for	now	I	want	to	consider	limiting	Tononi’s	II	proposal	to	qualia	(IITQ).		A	remaining	question	is	whether	the	IITQ	account	is	enough	to	convince	us	that	II	actually	is	qualia,	as	opposed	to	being	merely	a	neural	correlate	of	qualia.		To	see	why	the	IITQ	account	has	the	potential	to	go	beyond	mere	correlation	consider	first	why	resisting	identity	claims	is	so	compelling	in	the	case	of	the	mind.	
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The	resistance	to	recognizing	brain	properties	as	identical	to	mental	properties	like	qualia	or	consciousness	(or	even	more	behaviorally	analyzed	states	like	belief	or	desire)	is	dependent	upon	the	coupling	of	two	things:	(1)	the	pre-theoretic	(apparent)	independence	of	the	conscious	mental	realm	from	the	brain,	which	is	based	in	the	fact	that	“observation”	fails	to	reveal	a	connection	between	the	mind	and	brain,	and	(2)	the	high-level,	coarsely-grained,	and	simple	nature	of	the	brute	identifications	typically	involved	in	an	identity	claim	between	the	conscious	mind	and	brain	(e.g.,	pain	=	c-fibers	firing).		What	is	more,	condition	(1)	is	reinforced	by	condition	(2):	when	the	theory	embedding	the	identity	claim	requires	one	to	countenance	relatively	simple,	coarsely-grained,	and	high-level	brute	identities	between	the	mental	and	the	physical,	it	strengthens	the	sense	that	the	mental	properties	are	distinct	and	merely	correlated	with	the	physical.	The	II	account	begins	to	undo	this	bind	by	offering	a	complex,	fine-grained,	multi-level	theory	of	associations	and	compositional	identities	in	support	of	the	identification	of	qualia	with	II.		Where	it	comes	down	to	“brute	identifications,”	they	are	embedded	in	a	rich	theoretical	and	explanatory	context,	which	serves	as	further	warrant	for	the	identification.			Thus	as	an	account	of	qualia	only	in	the	q-character	sense,	IITQ’s	claim	that	the	qualitative	properties	of	experience	are	identical	to	the	II	properties	of	the	brain	meshes	more	smoothly	with	pre-theoretic	sensibilities	than	less	sophisticated	or	more	thoroughgoing	identity	claims	do.24		And	again,	the	II	account	doesn’t	reduce	qualia	to	physical	properties,	but	rather	identifies	them	with	the	informational	properties	of	the	physical	system,	as	Tononi	(2008,	232)	makes	explicit	in	his	assertion	that	they	are	not	reducible	to	the	neural	mechanisms	that	“generate”	them.	
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A	distinct	question	one	might	have	regarding	IITQ	concerns	how	to	explain	the	predictive	and	explanatory	power	of	II	connectivity	in	characterizing	normal	and	altered	states	of	consciousness.		If	II	is	qualia	and	not	consciousness,	then	why	does	II	track	consciousness?		That	is,	the	amount	of	II	appears	to	be	correlated	with	the	“amount	of	consciousness.”		A	number	of	explanations	are	available:		(1)	qualia	is	highly	correlated	with	consciousness;	(2)	a	certain	highly	connected	and/or	highly	centralized	set	of	connections	naturally	high	in	II	might	be	the	key	to	consciousness;	(3)	II/qualia	(loss	of)	may	well	be	the	key	to	unconsciousness	(loss	of	consciousness)	without	being	the	key	to	consciousness	(vs.	non-consciousness).	The	last	possibility,	the	one	that	grows	out	of	confusion	between	unconscious	and	non-conscious,	is	one	of	which	Tononi	and	other	researchers	approaching	consciousness	from	his	angle	have	to	be	wary.		While	the	loss	of	consciousness	(various	forms	of	altered	unconsciousness)	may	give	us	clues	about	consciousness,	simply	contrasting	what	happens	when	one	moves	between	consciousness	and	“a	dreamless	sleep”	runs	the	risk	of	missing	ground-level	conditions	for	the	possibility	of	consciousness	itself	(conscious	vs.	non-conscious).		Assuming	then	that	the	IITQ	is	plausible	and	enjoys	at	least	preliminary	confirmation,	I	now	return	to	the	question	of	what	it	might	tell	us	about	consciousness	itself.		
3.3	From	Qualia	back	to	Consciousness	Granting	that	the	question	of	(SIL-)consciousness	and	qualia,	understood	with	the	q-	and	s-character	distinction	in	mind,	are	distinct	and	that	Tononi’s	considerations	support	(at	most)	q-character	identification	with	II,	we	may	still	find	ways	to	connect	II	and	
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consciousness.		What	might	the	link	between	“qualia	as	II”	and	“consciousness	as	II”	be?		In	Tononi’s	(2008,	217-219)	phenomenological	thought	experiments	he	offers	the	following	possibility	(see	the	discussion	above	in	3.1	for	details):	1. consciousness	is	nothing	more	than	the	ability	(“intrinsic	potential”)	to	discriminate	between	certain	states	of	affairs	and	“a	multitude	of	others”	[by	way	of	the	q–character	of	its	states].	Recall	that	in	this	section	of	his	paper	Tononi	argues	for	equating	consciousness	with	integrated	information	roughly	because	the	perspectival	and	holistic	nature	of	consciousness	mirrors	the	holistic	and	“perspective-generating”	properties	of	the	II	polytrope	in	Q-space.			It	is	in	virtue	of	the	(holistic	and	perspectival)	properties	of	qualia	modeled	in	II	terms	that	the	account	becomes	about	consciousness	at	all,	which	I’ve	made	explicit	in	the	brackets	above	in	1.		Again,	Tononi’s	position	is	that	an	account	of	qualia	is	an	account	of	consciousness.		Thus	1	above	boils	down	to:	2. consciousness	is	nothing	more	than	each	(conscious)	experience	having	a	q-character.	But	this	(as	detailed	in	section	3.1)	collapses	a	priori	the	distinction	between	SIL-consciousness	(s-character)	and	phenomenality/qualia	(q-character);	it	is	a	departure	from	our	pre-theoretic	understanding	of	consciousness	and	qualia	that	isn’t	warranted	by	the	empirical	considerations	offered	by	Tononi.		That	said,	consciousness	(s-character)	might	turn	out	empirically	to	be	tied	to	the	qualia	(q-character)	in	that	an	experience’s	q-character	might	turn	out	to	have	a	common	underlying	explanation	that	makes	it	coextensive	with	s-character.		And	further,	s-character	might	turn	out	to	be	independent	from	q-character,	especially	if	q-character	is	II	and	s-character	is	(say)	along	the	lines	of	a	
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global	workspace	account.		Even	having	addressed	qualia	in	II	terms,	one	has	considerably	more	work	remaining	in	order	to	extend	the	account	to	consciousness,	and	it	ought	to	be	empirical	work,	not	merely	the	“defining	in”	of	the	solution	that	seems	to	tempt	many.	How	might	the	ongoing	confirmation	of	an	IITQ	lead	to	an	account	of	consciousness?		Presumably	IITQ	would	be	further	confirmed	by	further	mapping	the	integrated	connections	of	the	brain,	by	formally	characterizing	the	Q-spaces	associated	with	these	neural	complexes,	and	by	using	the	formal	Q-space	models	to	predict/retrodict	qualitative	aspects	of	consciousness.		This	process	of	confirmation	could	well	lead	to	“collateral”	discoveries	about	the	s-character	of	experience,	especially	since	the	qualitative	and	subjective	character	of	our	experience	seem	so	intimately	connected.		We	might	discover	that	the	Q-space	models	of	the	qualia	leave	nothing	further	to	be	explained	by	broader	SIL-notions	of	consciousness;	this	might	sound	like	a	reduction,	but	it	isn’t	a	reduction	to	
qualia,	rather	it	would	be	something	more	like	an	elimination,	but	the	point	to	note	is	that	it	would	be	something	other	than	an	a	priori	defining	away	(or	defining	in)	of	SIL-consciousness.		Alternatively,	the	fully	confirmed	II	account	and	Q-space	models	might	lead	to	the	discovery	of	higher-level	(irreducible)	II	dynamics	that	could	be	identified	with	consciousness.		Or	(as	I	suggested	above	in	section	3.2)	we	may	learn	that	something	like	a	global	or	centralized	or	highest-level	feature	of	brain	organization	is	required	to	supplement	the	II	account	with	respect	to	consciousness.		In	any	event,	these	possibilities	need	not	impugn	the	present	II	account	of	qualia.		
4.	Prospects:		Is	Integrated	Information	Fit	to	be	Fundamental?	
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I	now	examine	the	sense	in	which	II	is	a	“fundamental”	and	“intrinsic”	property	and	its	prospects	for	empirically	contributing	to	the	consciousness	question.			Tononi	(2008)	discusses	explicitly	the	“fundamentality”	of	consciousness	in	a	section	of	his	paper	(232-233),	but	here	it	seems	to	boil	down	to	the	idea	that	if	one	takes	II	as	consciousness,	then	since	consciousness	exists,	it	follows	that	“an	equally	valid	view	of	the	universe”	is	to	see	it	in	terms	of	II,	instead	of	mass,	for	example.		In	fact	this	may	be	a	more	valid	view	(according	to	Tononi),	“since	to	be	highly	consciousness	(to	have	high	Φ)	implies	there	is	something	it	is	like	to	be	you,	whereas	if	you	just	have	high	mass,	charge	or	energy,	there	may	be	little	to	nothing	it	is	like	to	be	you,”	and	hence	such	entities	“exist	in	a	stronger	sense	than	entities	of	high	mass”	(233).		Insight	as	to	how	Tononi	understands	II’s	fundamentality	can	be	gleamed	from	his	discussion	of	II’s	intrinsic	nature.		There,	Tononi	writes,	“Consciousness,	as	a	fundamental	property,	is	also	an	intrinsic	property”	(233).		The	idea	of	course	is	that	“there	being	something	it	is	like…”	is	paradigmatically	(though	contentiously)	an	intrinsic	property,	so	if	II	is	to	be	consciousness/qualia,	it	ought	to	be	intrinsic	too.25	But	this	is	a	rather	specialized	sense	of	intrinsic	Tononi	is	utilizing	here	because	as	he	puts	it,	this	“means	that	a	complex	generating	integrated	information	is	conscious	in	a	certain	way	regardless	of	any	extrinsic	perspective”	(233).26		Putting	these	two	ideas	together—it	seems	that	Tononi	is	really	asserting	only	that	II	is	a	feature	of	a	complex	that	exists	(fundamental)	and	does	so	independently	of	the	perspective	of	any	
observer	(intrinsic),	unlike	un-integrated	information.		Thus	the	key	assertion	here	is	that	II	is	an	objective	property—an	observer	independent	(real)	property.	Again,	I	am	not	concerned	here	with	the	philosophical	debate	about	what	counts	as	a	fundamental	(or	intrinsic)	property;	instead	I’m	out	to	understand	Tononi’s	sense	of	
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fundamental	and	then	assess	how	this	helps/hinders	his	account.		I	suggest	that	we	understand	II	more	along	the	lines	of	a	(higher-level)	property	such	as	fitness	(in	evolutionary	biology)	than	a	property	like	mass.		This	makes	sense	because	within	Tononi’s	account	II	doesn’t	“behave”	like	properties	usually	thought	of	as	fundamental.		How	much	II	is	present	depends	upon	the	level	under	consideration—it	can	be	found	only	at	appropriately	high	levels	where	there	are	complexes	acting	as	“mechanisms.”27		Additionally,	in	contrast	to	the	mass	of	a	composite,	which	is	reducible	to	the	mass	of	its	components,	II	and	fitness	are	not	“reducible”	all	the	way	down:	the	complex	(organism)	has	the	property	of	II	(fitness)	and	its	constituent	parts	do	not.		This	is	the	behavior	of	higher-level,	functional,	organizational,	relational,	or	even	“emergent”	properties.		Thus,	in	a	strict	philosophical	sense,	like	fitness,	II	is	relational	(not	intrinsic)	and	higher-level	(not	fundamental),	though	still	an	objective	property.	But	even	if	II	is	more	like	non-fundamental	properties	like	fitness,	there	is	still	an	important	sense	in	which	such	a	property	is	fundamental:		fitness	does	play	a	fundamental	
role	in	population	genetics	and	evolutionary	biology—that	is,	these	theories	accord	a	fundamental	explanatory	place	to	the	notion	of	fitness.		So	while	fitness	may	be	such	that	an	organism’s	fitness	supervenes	on	lower-level	(more	“fundamental”)	properties,	nevertheless,	for	explanatory	purposes	(within	the	particular	theory),	fitness	is	“fundamental”	in	the	sense	of	being	theoretically	indispensable	or	irreducible.		If	this	were	the	sense	in	which	Tononi	understood	II	as	fundamental	(as	he	well	may),	could	II	do	the	theoretical	work	Tononi	requires	of	it?		That	is,	what	if	II	is	only	explanatorily	fundamental	and	supervenes	on	lower-level	(more	fundamental)	properties	(e.g.,	neurophysiological)?		I	will	set	aside	this	question	for	IITC	and	focus	instead	on	II	as	an	account	of	qualia	(IITQ).	
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Qualia	(pre-theoretically	and	intuitively)	resist	reduction/identification	to	mere	neurophysiological	properties	(as	discussed	above),	and	one	of	the	apparent	virtues	of	the	II	proposal	is	that	it	doesn’t	reduce	qualia	(directly)	to	neurophysical	properties.		It	finesses	the	reduction	by	equating	qualia	with	an	informational	property,	not	a	purely	physical	one.		For	this	to	work,	informational	properties	have	to	be	fundamental,	at	least	in	the	sense	of	not	being	identical/reducible	to	physical	properties.		But	informational	properties	are	quite	likely	to	be	supervenient	on	the	physical	properties	of	the	system	under	consideration,	after	all	it	is	in	virtue	of	the	current	state’s	ability	to	“redistribute”	the	probability	distribution	of	the	previous	state	via	the	causal	properties	of	the	mechanism	that	it	carries	information	at	all.28		Thus	the	II	account	would	appear	amenable	to	physicalism	in	one	sense	or	another,	though	it	does	introduce	an	unusual	feature	from	a	physicalist	perspective:		a	lack	of	definiteness.	Despite	protestations	to	the	contrary,	Tononi’s	conception	of	II	seems	to	be	relative	to	the	spatiotemporal	grid	one	imposes	to	measure	II.		Tononi	concedes	that	the	working	hypothesis	must	be	that	“integrated	information	is	generated	at	multiple	spatiotemporal	scales,”	(235)	though	“there	will	often	be	a	privileged	spatiotemporal	‘grain	size’	at	which	a	given	system	forms	of	highest	Φ—the	spatiotemporal	scale	at	which	it	[the	system]	‘exists’	most	in	terms	of	integrated	information,	and	therefore	of	consciousness”	(236).		He	goes	on	to	suggest	that	preliminary	understanding	of	the	brain	would	suggest	that	the	optimal	spatial	level	for	high	Φ	is	the	“grain	size	of	neurons	or	minicolumns,”	and	similarly	at	the	temporal	level,	around	“tens	to	hundreds	of	milliseconds,	the	firing	pattern	of	a	large	complex	of	neurons	should	be	maximally	predictive	of	its	previous	state”	(236).	
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This	is	importantly	different	from	the	higher-level	irreducibility	discussed	above.		It	isn’t	just	that	there	is	a	level	at	which	it	doesn’t	make	sense	to	ask	about	II,	but	rather	that	one	obtains	different	(nonzero)	answers	to	how	much	II	is	present	at	different	levels/grain	sizes.		This	is	clearly	not	the	case	with	mass,	nor	is	true	of	fitness	in	the	same	sense.29		This	lack	of	definiteness	with	respect	to	II	would	seriously	undercut	it	as	the	key	to	consciousness.		This	is	because	some	other	consideration	(e.g.,	the	highest	or	the	most	central,	etc.)	has	to	be	brought	in	to	justify	that	a	given	level	is	the	one	whose	II	corresponds	to	consciousness,	and	thus	opens	the	door	for	some	other	property	to	be	at	least	jointly	determinative	of	the	degree	of	consciousness.	But	these	problems	are	largely	obviated	when	the	theory	is	“reigned	in”	to	the	more	modest	IITQ.		First,	the	IITQ	need	not	embrace	fundamentality/intrinsicness	to	the	same	extent.		In	fact	there	are	plenty	of	philosophical	proposals	that	back	away	from	qualia	as	intrinsic.30		The	irreducible,	explanatorily	fundamental,	and	objectively	real	conception	of	II	developed	by	Tononi	may	not	“fit	the	bill”	for	consciousness	as	it	is	generally	construed,	but	it	does	provide	a	philosophically	defensible	and	potentially	ground	breaking	empirical	framework	for	investigating	the	qualitative	properties	of	experience	(qualia).	Second,	multiple-level	indefiniteness	is	not	necessarily	a	stumbling	block	for	qualia	because	the	quantity	of	qualia	isn’t	really	the	issue,	the	structure	of	it	is.		It	is	not	even	clear	what	the	quantity	of	qualia	would	mean.		Qualia	in	conscious	experience	is	naturally	dependent	on	an	s-character,	so	the	details	of	subjectivity—both	phenomenologically	and	ultimately	neurologically—will	serve	to	pick	out	the	spatiotemporal	grain	size/level	of	II	that	is	germane	to	the	particular	qualia	questions	under	consideration,	e.g.,	the	color	of	the	red,	the	feel	of	the	tickle,	the	richness	of	the	note.		Additionally,	as	Tononi	notes,	qualitative	
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experiential	“fields”	are	often	complex,	not	qualia	in	the	“strict	philosophical	sense,”	but	rather	composites	of	such	qualia	(230-31),	so	the	fact	that	sub-complexes	and	sub-sub	complexes	(etc.)	each	have	“nesting”	Φ-values	is	merely	a	sign	of	this.	Thus	the	more	modest	IITQ	program	is	promising	empirically	and	if	ultimately	confirmed	may	help	dissolve	the	philosophical	puzzle	of	qualia	by	“peeling	it	off”	from	the	“harder”	problem	of	consciousness,	much	as	memory	or	language	have	been	“peeled	away”	from	it.		The	IITQ	locates	the	qualitative	properties	of	experience	in	the	brain	(like	memory)	and	yet	still	intimately	tied	to	consciousness	(also	like	memory),	via	its	s-character.		It	is	an	important	and	novel	feature	of	Tononi’s	work	that	in	“peeling	off”	qualia	from	the	problem	of	consciousness,	he	is	able	to	do	so	without	definitionally	excising	its	(potentially)	deep	connection	with	consciousness—a	connection	that	may	well	turn	out	to	be	an	important	step	to	understanding	consciousness	itself.31	A	further	interesting	feature	of	qualia	on	the	II	account	is	that	they	aren’t	precisely	functional	properties	in	the	standard	sense,	but	rather	as	the	formal	informational	properties	of	Q-space	are	what	might	be	called	“implementational	properties.”		As	discussed	above,	Tononi	understands	these	properties	themselves	as	supervening	on	the	physical	brain/body	system	and	hence	“allows	for”	qualia	to	be	investigated	empirically	by	science.		Philosophers	often	mistake	the	II	approach	for	a	functionalist	account	since	it	doesn’t	analyze	qualia/consciousness	in	messy	neuroscience	terms.		But	a	careful	read	of	Tononi	makes	clear	that	two	functionally	equivalent	neural	arrangements	can	differ	in	their	internal	integrated	information	and	hence	won’t	have	the	same	quality	of	experience.		This	could	happen	if	the	functional	neural	units	had	different	levels	of	redundancies	or	if	they	implemented	the	function	using	a	distinct	but	equivalent	logical	form	(a	negated	
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disjunction	of	negated	or-gates	instead	of	an	and-gate).		The	messy	details	of	the	implementation	of	the	system	do	matter,	if	not	to	behavior	then	certainly	to	consciousness.	Precisely	how	these	implementation	properties	are	related	to	the	functional	properties	of	the	brain	is	certain	to	be	rather	complicated.		Presumably	they	are	in	one	sense	at	a	lower	level	than	functional	properties—along	the	lines	of	the	hardware/software	dichotomy.		So	for	example,	the	functional	units	in	the	visual	system	are	implemented	by	various	neuronal	complexes	with	their	own	effectively	unique	implementational	(II/qualitative)	properties.		But	as	William	Lycan	(1987)	has	made	clear,	such	“levels”	are	not	likely	to	be	discrete	or	monotonic;	there	will	be	mixed	level	functional	(and	implementational)	complexes	that	interact	with	levels	both	“above”	and	“below”	and	“levels”	may	well	turn	back	on	themselves.		Developments	in	neurodynamics	have	further	confirmed	the	importance	of	understanding	the	brain	on	multiple,	involuted,	and	even	indistinct	levels.32				
5.	Closing	Thought	The	IITQ	approach	identifies	qualia	with	the	integrated	informational	properties	of	the	brain.		The	qualitative	properties	of	conscious	experience	are	understood	as	infomational,	not	functional.		On	this	understanding	the	IITQ	account	is	not	directly	about	conscious	experience	(SIL-consciousness);	rather	it	offers	an	account	of	the	various	qualitative	aspects	of	conscious	experience.		This	is	an	important	problem	in	its	own	right	of	course,	and	it	may	even	turn	out	to	be	the	key	to	consciousness,	but	so	construed	the	IITQ	account	doesn’t	conflate	qualia	and	consciousness,	nor	does	it	assume	that	an	account	of	qualia	immediately	yields	an	account	of	consciousness.		Depending	on	the	confirmational	details	
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of	IITQ	and	our	emerging	understanding	of	information	and	brain	dynamics,	it	may	turn	out	that	the	key	to	consciousness	is	emergent	dynamical	properties,	global	information	integration,	or	something	else	yet	to	be	discovered.		Alternatively,	things	may	go	a	more	deflationary	way,	namely	that	further	work	on	IITQ	and	the	various	functional	(autobiographical	memory,	volitional,	emotional,	etc.)	capacities	of	the	brain	reveal	that	the	predicate	“SIL-consciousness”	doesn’t	have	a	referent	once	qualia	and	the	functional	capacities	are	understood.		In	either	case	the	II	account	has	opened	up	a	way	to	decouple	the	fates	of	qualia	and	consciousness.				
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1 In applying information theory, Tononi (2008) sets it up so that the informational focus is 
always backwards in time.  Given a mechanism and current state, “the system’s mechanism and 
state constitute information (about the system’s previous state), in the classic sense of reduction 
of uncertainty or ignorance” (220).  This decision seems both substantive and arbitrary, with 
respect to consciousness.  Why not frame the application of information theory in a forward 
direction, so the mechanism and current state give information about the system’s next state?  
Perhaps this has something to do with how information theory is typically developed, but given 
that a finite state mechanism is assumed, it seems “forward probabilities” would work as well.  I 
return to this question below. 
2 See Herstein (1975, 40ff) for more detail. 
3 I presume another way of stating this is that MIP is the decomposition into parts that maximize 
II for the parts considered independently.  It isn’t entirely clear how to understand MIP because 
it is characterized as both the partition that leaves the least information unaccounted for and the 
partition of the system into minimal parts; it is not hard to imagine that these might be 
equivalent, but something ought to be said to establish this in general. 
4 Making use of the actual “causal mechanism” to ground eligible partitions raises its own 
questions, the first being, why think the causal approach is univocal?  It may well be that given 
the complexity (on multiple levels) of the brain/body system, no unique causal schematization 
exists either.  And what is more pressing, if neurodynamicists like Walter Freeman (2001) are on 
the right track, then the entire notion of “causal mechanism,” traditionally construed has no 
application to the brain/body system.  See Freeman (2001, esp. 126-140) for discussion. 
5 Actually the partition need not be unique as long as it can be established that each of the non-
unique maximums yield the same entropy relative to p(X0(mech, x1)), but again this is a far from 
trivial result to establish.  The possibility of this lack of uniqueness is acknowledged in Balduzzi 
and Tononi (2008, 7) and there they stipulate without explanation that the partition with the 
lowest (un-normalized) effective information be taken to be the MIP. 
6 I return to the question of “grain size” below in Section 4.  I am grateful to an anonymous 
reviewer for this journal for this insight regarding Tononi’s possible response. 
7 Barrett and Seth (2011) have recently generalized a version of Φ for less idealized continuous 
systems but in doing so back off both the claim that their version of Φ can be interpreted as 
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identical to consciousness (13-14) and even that it can be given a physical interpretation at all. 
(15). 
8 The problem that arises for infinite cases is that the interpretation of the probability calculus 
becomes trickier, since further formal constraints (with problematic scientific interpretations) 
become necessary to not violate the formal calculus and retain finite maximum entropy 
distributions.  See Sec. 2.2 below for discussion of interpretive difficulties with probability. 
9 There is reason to think such exponential increase in dimension can both be physically 
meaningful and tractable from a mathematical standpoint, since the application of knot theory in 
the theoretical physics formalism of M-theory has accomplished something similar. While the 
details are beyond the scope of this paper, these	developments in knot theory may also provide a 
principled means of determining a definite probability distribution and thus obviating another of 
the formal concerns with the II account.  I owe thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
10 Beaton (forthcoming) “Integrated Information and Internalism.” 
11 See Eells (1991, esp. 34-55) for a philosophical discussion of interpretations of probability and 
further references.   
12 As an anonymous reviewer rightly points out, to the extent that the II account is equivalent (or 
dependent on) understanding consciousness in terms of probability, discussions of probability in 
this context are closely related to discussions of meaning.  A real virtue of the II approach is its 
natural connection to the notion of meaning and semantics (Tononi 2008, 338-9), thus Tononi’s 
account of meaning may well provide the key to the appropriate interpretation of probability.  I 
limit my critique here (and revised philosophical understanding) to qualia/consciousness, but my 
proposal retains this natural connection to meaning.  It is worth pointing out that Tononi’s 
discussion of meaning appears to point to a subjectivist and externalist interpretation, which 
seems to be at odds with his internalist operationalization of II in terms of Φ.  See Beaton 
(forthcoming) for a careful critique of Tononi’s operationalization of II. 
13 Compare this definition to Boly and Massimini and Tononi’s (2009, 386) characterization of it 
as “what disappears when you go into a dreamless sleep.”  I believe them equivalent for my 
purposes here, especially since both use an intuitive definite description that remains “topically 
neutral” as to the neurophysiological basis of the phenomenon.  One possible difference is that 
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red qualia disappear when one goes into a dreamless sleep, but it isn’t obvious that red qualia are 
a necessary part of being conscious, so I favor the Nagel version used above. 
14 The kind of properties I have in mind by “natural” are fundamental or simple properties in the 
rough sense in which we do believe that there is property in the world that corresponds to “being 
a hydrogen atom” or “being a water molecule,” but not to “being a mousetrap.”   
15 For prominent examples see Block (1980), Jackson (1982), and Chalmers (1999). 
16 Tim Bayne (2007) makes related points (using Searle’s terminology) between a unified field 
vs. building block approach to the structure of consciousness. 
17 For example, the same neural mechanism generates different shapes in Q-space depending on 
its other connections just as the quality of experience depends on “context” (228), the modalities 
of experience are captured by densely entangled q-arrows in Q-space (227, 230), “elementary 
experiences” (simple qualia) correspond to densely entangled complexes without further 
entangled sub-complexes (230), overlapping hierarchies of entanglement within nested 
complexes correspond to overlapping hierarchies within phenomenological fields (231), the 
difference between “categorical” sense modalities (smell) and “topographical” ones (vision) are 
captured by difference basic sub-shapes in Q-space (231).  See Tononi (2008, esp. 230-232) for 
details and further examples. 
18 I am not convinced there really is a “hard problem” in Chalmers’ sense.  Nonetheless the 
problem of consciousness concerns both the SIL-consciousness of creatures and the 
phenomenality of their mental states and if the II account is on the right track, then SIL-
consciousness may well be the “harder” of the two. 
19 Kriegel parses things a bit differently.  Kriegel uses p-consciousness on the creature level to 
indicate consciousness taken as a whole in its full sense, much like my SIL-consciousness.  But 
Kriegel also uses p-consciousness as a property of a mental state: a p-conscious state has an s-
character and q-character, whereas on my approach, a SIL-conscious entity may have aspects of 
its consciousness with s- and q-characters.  In either case, it is the q-character that corresponds to 
qualia and the s-character that presupposes SIL-consciousness experiencer. 
20 There is preliminary empirical reason to doubt that on an intuitive level SIL-consciousness 
“entails” qualia.  See Sytsma and Machery (2010) and Peressini (forthcoming) on intuitions and 
pre-theoretic rationales regarding qualia and SIL-consciousness. 
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21 It would also seem to follow from this reasoning that in cases of a severed corpus callosum (so 
called “split-brain”) there are in fact two consciousnesses.  Tononi (2008, 219) “bites the bullet” 
and writes that in such cases “the surgery has created two separate consciousnesses instead of 
one.”  This seems to be a departure from reported first person experience in such cases and also 
from the how we tend to think of SIL-consciousness from a pre-theoretical perspective. 
22 As Ned Block (2009) argues, the explanatory gap should be present in any responsible account 
at this stage since science hasn’t yet provided us with the same sort of enriched conceptual 
apparatus that allowed us to understand heat as motion and light as vibration in ways the ancients 
couldn’t imagine.  As I will argue below, IITQ may be an initial step in that direction. 
23 It should be pointed out that Tononi’s empirical and phenomenological evidence could well be 
consistent with the discovery that SIL-consciousness is (for example) some sort of global 
workspace, which in the case of creatures like us is generated out of highly integrated 
informational neural complexes, hence the correlation between high II and SIL-consciousness. 
24 Shaun Nichols (2011) has a different but still generally supportive (of my point above) account 
of our resistance to mind/brain identity claims that focuses on how our “low path” 
neuro/cognitive wiring that intuitively recognizes conscious beings won’t likely ever be engaged 
by the theoretical reduction of consciousness to brain activity.  If he is right then even a finely 
grained complex reduction is going to leave us feeling at least partially unsatisfied with a 
scientific account.  
25 Tononi gives up a standard understanding of qualia’s intrinsicness when he asserts that the 
univocal specification of qualia by the Q-space shape shows that “the ‘inverted spectrum’ is 
impossible…” (241, note 8). 
26 Returning again to the question about the direction of information “flow” (note 1), the choice 
of focusing on the previous state in defining II does seem to make II dependent	on	the	external	perspective	of	whether	one	considers	it	to	be	information	about	the	previous	or	subsequent	state,	and	thereby	undercut	the	claim	of	intrinsicness. 
27 As I noted in Section 2.1, it is a bit tricky reading Tononi on this point because in places he 
seems to assume there is a physically privileged and fundamental mechanistic description of 
every physical system.  If so, then some qualification in my indeterminacy critique may be 
necessary.  Nonetheless, even granting such a fundamental level for the privileged mechanistic 
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description, my point that the components of this mechanism themselves do not have II (unlike 
mass) goes though. 
28 In general, Tononi does intend informational properties to supervene on the physical, but he 
does make one reference to the idea that information may be “in an ontological sense, prior to 
conventional physical properties . . .” (233).  By this he intends a informational interpretation of 
quantum physics and cites Wheeler and Ford (1998). 
29 It is true that an organism has a fitness and so do some of its proper parts, alleles, for example, 
but this is rather different since fitness, properly speaking, applies fundamentally to individual 
organisms and only derivatively to alleles, i.e., the fitness of an allele is defined as the average 
fitness of the organisms possessing it.  Even if one is a pluralist about the level(s) of selection 
and understands genes as having fitness nonderivatively, there is still a level below genes the 
elements of which do not have the property of fitness. 
30 See for example Johnsen (1997) and Nikolinakos (1994) and Tye (2007), and of course 
Dennett (1988).  It would be an interesting project to work out the extent to which this 
interpretation of Tononi’s IITQ was anticipated by Dennett’s (1988) phenomenological 
information property (PIPs) detectors, which were in turn inspired by Dretske’s information 
(1981) account. 
31 It may also turn out that after “peeling away” qualia, nothing much is left of the harder 
problem of SIL-consciousness, being open to this as an empirical possibility is yet another 
positive feature of the II approach. 
32 See for example Walter Freeman’s (2000) work on neurodynamics with its interacting micro, 
meso, and macro levels. 
